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ABSTRACT
In recent months there has been an increase in the popularity and public awareness of secure,
cloudless ﬁle transfer systems. The aim of these services is to facilitate the secure transfer of ﬁles
in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion over the Internet without the need for centralized authentication
or storage. These services can take the form of client installed applications or entirely web browser
based interfaces. Due to their P2P nature, there is generally no limit to the ﬁle sizes involved or to
the volume of data transmitted  and where these limitations do exist they will be purely reliant on
the capacities of the systems at either end of the transfer. By default, many of these services provide
seamless, end-to-end encryption to their users. The cybersecurity and cyberforensic consequences
of the potential criminal use of such services are signiﬁcant. The ability to easily transfer encrypted
data over the Internet opens up a range of opportunities for illegal use to cybercriminals requiring
minimal technical know-how. This paper explores a number of these services and provides an
analysis of the risks they pose to corporate and governmental security. A number of methods for
the forensic investigation of such transfers are discussed.
Keywords: Covert Transfers, Encrypted Data Transmission, Counter-forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
For the typical home user, sending anything
larger than a single image or document elec-
tronically is still a cumbersome task when re-
liant on popular online communication meth-
ods. Most email providers will limit the ﬁle
size of attachments to something in the order of
megabytes and many will additionally restrict
ﬁle types such as executables or password pro-
tected archives based on internal security poli-
cies. Sending larger ﬁles usually requires users
to upload the content to third party storage
providers, e.g., Dropbox, OneDrive, Box.net,
etc., and provide a link to the content to their
intended recipients. From a security standpoint,
this leaves user vulnerable to their communica-
tion being intercepted or duplicated and their
data being downloaded by others. Regarding
the security of their data stored on this third-
party provider, users must blindly trust this
third-party to not access or share their data with
any unauthorized party.
While the requirement to send larger volumes
of information over the Internet is ever increas-
ing, the potential for third-party interception, or
illicit access to, this data has become a common
story in the general media. Recent leaks from
whistle-blowers regarding the degree of surveil-
lance conducted by large government funded
spying agencies on everyday citizens has pushed
the topic of cybersecurity into the public realm.
Increasingly, Internet users are becoming con-
scious of their personal responsibility in the pro-
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tection of their digital information. This results
in many users being discontent with their per-
sonal data stored on these third party servers 
likely stored in another jurisdiction with privacy
requirements much lower than those of their own
locale.
To respond to this demand a number of ﬁle
exchange/transfer services have grown in pop-
ularity in recent months facilitating the secure
transfer of ﬁles in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion
from point A to point B. Most of these services
aﬀord the user encrypted end-to-end ﬁle trans-
fer and add an additional level of anonymity
compared to regular ﬁle transfer services, e.g.,
email attachments, FTP or instant message ﬁle-
sharing. The more security concerned users will
opt for the cloudless versions of these services.
This independent control over personal informa-
tion has advantages and disadvantages for the
end user. The advantage is that the user has
precise knowledge over who has initial access to
his/her information and what country the data
is stored in. The downside comes in terms of
reliability. The data stored or transferred us-
ing these services is only available if at least one
host storing the ﬁle is online.
As with most security or privacy enhanc-
ing Internet services, these services are open
to abuse by cybercriminals. In eﬀect, the ad-
ditional level of anonymity and security pro-
vided by these services provides cybercriminals
with oﬀ-the-shelf counter-forensic capabilities
for information exchange. Cybercriminal ac-
tivities such as data exﬁltration, the distribu-
tion of illicit images of children, piracy, indus-
trial espionage, malicious software distribution,
and can all potentially be facilitated by the
use of these services. The ad hoc nature and
mainstream protocol features of some of these
services make secure detection and prevention
problematic without causing disruption to nor-
mal Internet usage. This also causes forensic
event reconstruction diﬃculties as any traces
have a high degree of volatility when compared
to more traditional ﬁle transfer options.
1.1 Contribution of this work
For many, the topic of covert channels imme-
diately brings to mind some form of steganog-
raphy likely in combination with an Internet
anonymizing service, such as Tor and I2P. While
some work has been conducted on the re-
verse engineering/evidence gathering of these
anonymizing P2P proxy services, little work has
been done in the area of online services provid-
ing end users with the ability to securely and
covertly transfer information from peer to peer
in an largely undetectable manner. This work
presented as part of this paper examines a num-
ber of popular client application and web based
services, outlines their functionality, discusses
the forensic consequences and proposes a num-
ber methods for potentially retrieving evidence
from these services.
2. BACKGROUND
READING
The technology used to facilitate covert ﬁle
transfers is not new, however, until recently such
measures were deemed too complex to be con-
sidered of beneﬁt to the average user. Mainte-
nance of FTP servers, dynamic DNS for pub-
lic IP based system shares and management of
public/private keypairs for SSH are not tasks
a non-technical individual can accomplish with-
out technical assistance or a very thorough how-
to guide. The current transfer options, while
easy to implement and in some cases, completely
transparent to the user, can all be found to have
a more complex root in one of the following
methods or techniques.
2.1 Anonymizing Services
Today there are many anonymizing services
available for communication and data trans-
fer. The popular anonymous browser Tor al-
lows users to explore the Internet without the
risk of their location or identity becoming known
[Loesing et al., 2010]. The Tails operating sys-
tem which works in conjunction with Tor oﬀers
an extra layer of anonymity over traditional op-
erating systems. When a user is operating Tails
all connections are forced to go through the Tor
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network and cryptographic tools are used to en-
crypt the users data. The operating system will
leave no trace of any activity unless explicitly
deﬁned by the user to do so.
The Invisible Internet Project, also known as
I2P is another anonymous service similar to Tor.
As I2P is designed as an anonymous network
layer which will allow users to utilize their own
applications across the network. Unlike Tor cir-
cuits the I2P network traﬃc utilises multiple
layers of encryption and an addressing system
not based on IP or ISP to provide anonymity.
This process decouples a user's online identity
and physical location [Timpanaro et al., 2014].
I2P also groups network messages together in
irregular groupings for encryption to discourage
network traﬃc analysis. Like Tor, I2P allows
for passage through its network to a server or
service not hosted within its area of inﬂuence.
This is managed through the use of Outprox-
ies which perform the same function as Tor exit
nodes.
Both Tor and I2P provide anonymity to the
user with an open network of onion routers in
the case of Tor and Garlic routing in the case
of I2P. These networks of routers are run by
participating volunteers and it is continually
growing. The result of this network growth
is an increase in anonymity and privacy for
each individual user [Herrmann and Grothoﬀ,
2011]. However these services are not without
drawbacks such as a severe reduction in net-
work throughput resulting in much slower access
speeds (though I2P has greater reported perfor-
mance than Tor, in particular for P2P down-
loading protocols but it has fewer Outproxies
than Tor has exit nodes resulting in a lesser de-
gree of anonymization). Many software pack-
ages (those not SOCKS aware in the case of
Tor) are not designed to correctly route through
these services and will instead provide informa-
tion that will potentially reveal the identity of
the user such as the local, true, IP address for
response traﬃc to be delivered to. For the end
user, there is also the issue of adding yet an-
other step to the already technical task they ﬁnd
themselves performing.
2.2 Decentralized Oﬀsite Data
Storage
The MAIDSafe network is a P2P storage facility
that allows members to engage in a data stor-
age exchange. Each member of the network en-
ables the use of a portion of their local hard
drive by other members of the network. In re-
turn the member is given the use of an equiv-
alent amount of storage distributed across the
network and replicated to multiple locations re-
ferred to as Vaults. This allows the authorized
member access from any location and resilience
should a portion of the network not be active
at any time. All data stored on the network
is deduplicated and replicated in real time with
ﬁle signatures to ensure integrity. In addition
the data is encrypted allowing secure storage on
untrusted remote systems. Authorized access
is managed through a two factor authentication
process involving a password and pin combina-
tion. The use of the MAIDSafe network is in-
centivized through SafeCoin, a cryptocurrency
that members can earn by renting out space or
providing resources such as bandwidth for ﬁle
transfers. Other users can earn SafeCoins by
participating in development of the protocol.
2.3 Data Exﬁltration through
Standard File Transfer Channels
Data exﬁltration refers to the unauthorized ac-
cess to otherwise conﬁdential, proprietary or
sensitive information. Giani et al. [2006] out-
lines a number of data exﬁltration methods in-
cluding most regular ﬁle transfer methods for
inside man attacks, e.g, HTTP, FTP, SSH and
email, and external attacks including social en-
gineering, botnets, privilege escalation and root-
kit facilitated access. Detection of most of these
methods is possible using a combination of ﬁre-
walls and network intrusion detection systems
or deep packet inspection [Liu et al., 2009, Sohn
et al., 2003, Cabuk et al., 2009].
2.4 File Delivery Services Built on
Anonymizing Networks
OnionShare is a ﬁle sharing application that
leverages the anonymity of Tor to provide se-
cure ﬁle transfers for its users. File transfers
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are direct from uploader to recipient though
both users utilize the Tor browser to participate.
OnionShare itself is a python based application
that sets up a ﬁle share on the local system as a
limited web server. This web server is then ad-
vertised as a Tor Hidden Service using the built
in functionality of the Tor browser. The appli-
cation uses random data to generate a 16 char-
acter onion address and more random data to
generate a unique name for the ﬁle being shared
to use as a reference for.
The process used by OnionShare is as follows:
1. Uploader starts Tor Browser to provide an
entry point for OnionShare to the Tor net-
work.
OnionShare is started and a temporary di-
rectory is created in the users' default temp
folder. All randomly generated names in
OnionShare follow the same procedure:
(a) A number of random bytes are gener-
ated using os.random. 8 are generated
for a directory/host name and 16 for
the ﬁlename "slug" used to generate
the ﬁle portion of the share URL
(b) These random bytes are SHA-256 and
the rightmost 16 characters of the re-
sulting hash are carved
(c) h is then Base32 encoded, all charac-
ters are converted to lower case and
any trailing `=' signs are removed
2. The result is then used as a URL using the
format <host>.onion/<fileID> and this is
the url the Tor browser advertises to the
introduction nodes and registers on DHT.
3. The uploader then sends the URL to the
downloader who must use the URL within
a timeframe (24 hours by default) or the
signature of the ﬁle HS timestamp will not
match, a process controlled by the ItsDan-
gerous library for python. In addition to
this time limit, OnionShare also utilizes a
download counter which has a default value
of 1. Once the number of downloads suc-
cessfully initiated matches this counter, the
link is no longer considered valid and all in-
coming URLs with the same ﬁle signature
are refused.
This combination of time and availability in
conjunction with the anonymity of Tor makes
OnionShare traﬃc extremely diﬃcult to analyze
eﬀectively. If the traﬃc is observed then the
link is already invalidated. Similarly, if the ﬁle
is discovered on a local ﬁlesystem by an investi-
gator any trace of the once oﬀ connection to the
download point, if not already lost from local
connection logs or memory, will only lead to a
Tor entry point and not to the actual source of
the ﬁle.
3. INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNIQUES
While no work targeted speciﬁcally at foren-
sic investigation of these zero conﬁguration ser-
vices has been published at the time of writ-
ing, there are a number of digital evidence ac-
quisition methods published for related services.
There has , however, been security focused work
published on HTML5 additions including an
analysis of the webstore and localstore in-
troduced in this version of the protocol such as
that produced by Bogaard and Parody [2012].
This section outlines a number of related inves-
tigation techniques and analyses their relevancy
to the forensic recovery of evidence from covert
ﬁle transfer services.
3.1 Cloud Storage Forensics
Forensics of cloud storage utilities can prove
challenging, as presented by Chung et al.
[2012a]. The diﬃculty arises because, unless
complete local synchronization has been per-
formed, the data can be stored across vari-
ous distributed locations. For example, it may
only reside in temporary local ﬁles, volatile
storage (such as the system's RAM) or dis-
persed across multiple datacenters of the ser-
vice provider's cloud storage facility. Any digi-
tal forensic examination of these systems must
pay particular attention to the method of ac-
cess, usually the Internet browser connecting
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to the service provider's storage access page
(https://www.dropbox.com/login for Dropbox
for example). This temporary access serves to
highlight the importance of live forensic tech-
niques when investigating a suspect machine
as a pull out the plug anti-forensic technique
would not only lose access to any currently
opened documents but may also lose any cur-
rently stored sessions or other authentication to-
kens that are stored in RAM.
Martini and Choo [2013] published the results
of a cloud storage forensics investigation on the
ownCloud service from both the perspective of
the client and the server elements of the service.
They found that artifacts were found on both
the client machine and on the server facilitat-
ing the identiﬁcation of ﬁles stored by diﬀerent
users. The module client application was found
to store authentication and ﬁle metadata relat-
ing to ﬁles stored on the device itself and on
ﬁles only stored on the server. Using the client
artifacts, the authors were able to decrypt the
associated ﬁles stored on the server instance.
3.2 Network Forensics
Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs) are
designed to work alongside traditional network
security practices, i.e., intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) and ﬁrewalls. They preserve a long
term record of network traﬃc and facilitates
quick analysis of any identiﬁed issues [Corey
et al., 2002]. Most ﬁrewalls allow HTTP and
HTTPS traﬃc through to allow users behind
the ﬁrewall to have access to regular web ser-
vices which operate over these protocols. With
regards to the web based covert ﬁle transfer
services (outlined in detail in Section4 below),
blocking network traﬃc to these systems would
require the maintenance of a comprehensive ﬁre-
wall list of such servers to ensure no unautho-
rized data exﬁltration. NFATs collecting this in-
formation will only have the ability to capture
the encrypted packets, their destination and as-
sociated metadata. Identifying precisely what
has been transferred will likely prove impossible
for network administrators.
The issue with always-on active network
forensics is dealing real-time with the large vol-
umes of traﬃc involved. One approach to over-
come the massive volume of network data to pro-
cess is to simply record every packet sent and re-
ceived from the Internet, in the similar manner
to the tactic employed in the case outlined by
Garﬁnkel [2002]. This would facilitate an after-
the-fact reconstruction of any data breaches to
aid in determining precisely what was compro-
mised.
3.3 Deep-Web Forensics
Although Tor and I2P are designed for users to
communicate and transfer data on the Internet
anonymously it is still viable and possible for
investigators to gather user speciﬁc information.
The process of an investigation into the Tor net-
work requires advanced digital forensic knowl-
edge as traditional investigation methods used
for standard networks fail to heed the desired
results. Loesing et al. [2010] published a study
measuring statistical data in the Tor network.
The study is weighted towards protecting the
users anonymity while using Tor but nonetheless
shows that it is technically possible to gather
data on Tor users by setting up a Tor relay and
logging all relayed user traﬃc.
When users install Tor the software ﬁrst con-
nects to one of the directory authorities. The di-
rectory authorities are operated by trusted indi-
viduals of Tor and from these authorities the Tor
software downloads the list of currently available
Tor nodes. These nodes are relay servers that
are run by volunteers of Tor. The Tor client
then selects three nodes from those available
and builds an encrypted channel to the entry
node. An encrypted channel is then built from
the entry node to the middle node, and lastly
this channel connects to the exit node.
Blond et al. [2011] demonstrated the results
of an attack on the Tor anonymity network that
revealed 10,000 IP addresses over 23 days. The
authors used the attack to obtain the IP ad-
dresses of BitTorrent users on Tor. The study
found that 72% of users were speciﬁcally us-
ing Tor to connect to the tracker. The authors
launched their attacks through six instrumented
Tor exit nodes resulting in 9 percent of all Tor
streams being traced. Moreover, the paper anal-
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yses the type of content discovered in the attack
culminating in the result that the existence of
an underground BitTorrent ecosystem existing
on Tor is plausible. Alongside these attacks Tor
users were also proﬁled. Using BitTorrent as
the insecure application they hijacked the sta-
tistical properties of the DHT and the tracker
responses.
4. EVOLUTION OF HTML5
POWERED COVERT FILE
TRANSFER SERVICES
While services like Onionshare provide a method
of ﬁle transfer that is diﬃcult to investigate due
to its limited lifespan and shifting end points, it
still requires software installation and additional
support services in the form of the Tor Browser.
These requirements allow for several methods of
access control such as a security policy block-
ing local services attempting to communicate
on port 9159 and 9051, the default Tor Con-
trol Ports. On an application level local, group
or layer 7 ﬁrewall policies can block tor.exe or
onionshare.py based on path or ﬁle hash with-
out undue interruption to normal user network
usage.
4.1 Basic HTML5 File Transfer
Basic HTML5 File transfer as depicted in Fig-
ure 1 is accomplished using native browser APIs
that allow a user to utilize a data transfer ob-
ject. This object consists of a customizable ar-
ray of key:value pairs that represent a group of
ﬁle objects. This associative array is then acces-
sible by client side scripts run from a web page
or web application. These scripts must ﬁrst be
downloaded and allowed to run by the local user
(this depends on the trust setting for the web-
site being visited). Any element can be added
to the array through a Drag and Drop (DnD)
functionality or ﬁles can be added though a ﬁle
browser interface. The actions available by de-
fault are:
 copy: A copy of the source item may be
made at the new location.
Figure 1: The Basic HTML5 Data Transfer Pro-
cess
 move: An item may be moved to a new
location.
 link: A link may be established to the
source at the new location.
 copyLink: A copy or link operation is per-
mitted.
 copyMove: A copy or move operation is
permitted.
 linkMove: A link or move operation is per-
mitted.
 all: All operations are permitted.
 none: The item may not be dropped
if the element added to the array is a ﬁle
then the element is passed to a FileReader ob-
ject that copies the data contained in the ﬁle
to localstorage or session storage depend-
ing on the settings of the web application. Lo-
cal Storage is shared across all browser sessions
Page 140 © 2015 ADFSL
HTML 5 Zero Conﬁguration Covert Channels: Security ... 2015 CDFSL Proceedings
currently active, session storage is only avail-
able to the owning application or window (for
browsers with multiple tabs or windows). This
local/session storage behaves very similarly to
the standard cookie storage but with hugely in-
creased capacity. ( 5MB for Chrome, Firefox
and Opera, 10MB for Internet Explorer - DnD
native is only available in version 9+ of IE -
web storage in version 8+, and 25MB for Black-
berry).
For basic data transfer, the Filereader reads
the entire ﬁle indicated into RAM for process-
ing. Once stored in web storage a ﬁle can only be
accessed by local actions that have permission
to access that web storage area such as client
side scripts downloaded from the controlling web
page or session. These scripts can use any script-
ing language but usually JQuery, JavaScript or
AJAX. The local client can also call scripts to
run on the remote server in order to pass vari-
ables or prepare for the establishment of addi-
tional sessions are required.
4.2 Cryptographically enhanced
HTML5 data channels
Following on from their acquisition of ON2 in
February 2010, Google continued to develop a
browser to browser data transfer protocol, which
was made open source in 2011 when it was
adopted by W3C as a standard for HTML5.
The protocol, which supported Real Time Com-
munication between browsers was released as
WebRTC 1.0, was developed to provide P2P
voice, video and data transfers between browsers
without an additional software requirements.
WebRTC, provides a collection of protocols and
methods as well as a group of codec libraries
that can be accessed via a JavaScript API.
WebRTC improved data transfer over the
standard HTML5 script based method by in-
troducing data integrity, source authentication
and end to end encryption. This is accomplished
through the use of Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Modadugu and Rescorla [2004]
extension to handle key exchange for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). The use
of DTLS-SRTP diﬀers from standard VOIP en-
cryption by removing the need to trust SIP re-
Figure 2: Traditional VOIP Data vs DTLS-
SRTP
lays that form the path between the source and
destination.
In Figure 2, the standard VOIP method of
communication is displayed alongside the newer
WebRTC method. Both systems start with es-
tablishing a signaling and control path to handle
non-sensitive data such as connection auditing
packets. In VOIP, the data stream would follow
this established path and traﬃc between Client
A and Client B involving relay through Relays
1 and 2. Unless the user fully trusts both relays
and the security of the network path between
each node on the network, there is a risk of
an adversary eavesdropping on the data stream
and either manipulating the content in transit
or capturing it for oine inspection.
5. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING
SERVICES
Services such as those presented in Table 1 are
a sample set of HTML5 and WebRTC based ﬁle
transfer utilities. While at ﬁrst glance many
of these applications appear to be homogenous
closer examination shows important diﬀerences
in both capabilities and requirements. Of the
services listed, only Sharefest and JustBeamIt
allow usage without local installation or some
form of authentication. Of these, JustBeamIt
is based on basic HTML5 ﬁle transfer while
Sharefest utilizes WebRTC. While Sharefest
purports to oﬀer persistent storage, it does so
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Sharefest 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 3
JustBeamIt 7 3 7 7 7 3 7 7
Transfer Big Files 3 3 3 7 7 3 3 3
Inﬁnit 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 3
Any Send 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 7
Rejetto 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
QikShare 7 3 3 7 7 3 3 3
Table 1: Comparison of Browser Based Transfer Services
by virtue of its distributed organization. Stor-
age is only available as long as at least one share
member is online. While many of the services do
not provide encrypted ﬁle transfer, the threat
posed lies in the fact that any illegal or illicit
data transfer can be diﬃcult, if not impossible,
to diﬀerentiate from standard web traﬃc.
5.1 HTML5 Enabled Peer-to-Peer
Transfer
This section examines a number of HTML5 en-
abled P2P transfer sites and describes their op-
eration.
5.2 Sharefest
Sharefest.me is a ﬁle-sharing one-to-many
based website that aims to dynamically gener-
ate and maintain ﬁle-sharing swarms by con-
necting peers that are interested in sharing the
same data. Like the BitTorrent protocol, multi-
ple peers are utilized simultaneously to transfer
portions of the data thus increasing download
speeds by avoiding the bottleneck that is the
lower upload speed of a standard ADSL Internet
connection. In order to achieve this, Sharefest
is built on Peer5's (https://peer5.com/) plat-
form for a distributed Internet, a P2P data
transfer mesh network that utilizes the capabil-
ities of the browser without additional plugins
Figure 3: Sharefest P2P Mesh over WebRTC
beyond a WebRTC capable browser.
As depicted in Figure 3, the Sharefest pro-
cess is quite straightforward in design. The
sharefest.me server acts as a transfer control
server that records all ﬁles being oﬀered for shar-
ing and matches the resource to the client sys-
tem request. In the scenario depicted, Client
A has a complete ﬁle that it wants to share.
Client A connects to the Sharefest server at
https://www.sharefest.me/ over port 443 and
negotiate TLS1.2 where possible using SPDY if
available for web content transfer. Given a full
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range of options the Sharefest server negotiates
the use of the ECDHE-ECDSA with AES 128
and GCM 256. As required by the IETF RFC
4492 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc449),
the Sharefest server passes the curve details as
part of its serverkeyexchange packet.
Once a secure path is established the server
delivers a small set of helper scripts to the client:
 ﬁles.js : a script to gather ﬁle details from
the client
 ui.js : a script to control the update and
display of the ﬁle management interface on
the page.
Once a ﬁle has been selected for sharing the
Sharefest server assigns a code value in the form
of a URL such as https://www.sharefest.me/
67509cb244257b6643540dda512f8171 where
the number after the domain name is the
swarmID for this ﬁle. The SwarmID has 32
characters but is not based on the MD5 of the
ﬁle, instead it appears to be derived from the
Sharefest crypto.js script which incorporates
SHA3 in a lengthy calculation. The swarmID is
deterministic meaning that any client sharing
the same ﬁle will identiﬁed with the same
swarmID.
Once clients oﬀering and requesting the same
ﬁle or ﬁle set are identiﬁed the Sharefest server
acts as a central traﬃc control and initiates a
STUN connection directly between the partic-
ipating clients. In Figure 3, Clients A, C and
D are all participating in the swarm for File 1,
but Client B is not involved. The STUN con-
nection consists of each pair of clients issuing
BIND requests from uploader to downloader us-
ing STUN over UDP which allows each host to
discover its own public facing IP address in or-
der to create end to end connections through a
NAT gateway or ﬁrewall. Each BIND / Conﬁrm
pair is re-issued on a regular, short, interval to
ensure the connection remains intact. Once the
STUN session is active the two peers negotiate
a WebRTC session and switch over to the proto-
col's encryption. ACK and STUN conﬁrmation
messages continue to be sent to and from the
Sharefest server and the peers throughout the
exchange.
Sharefest is an example of P2P privacy in a
distributed network ensuring that data can be
transferred without risk of interception. This
level of privacy comes at a cost though as the
ability of IT security to inspect the traﬃc is
greatly diminished with the level of encryption
in use at all stages of the transfer. Packet anal-
ysis can detect the IP addresses in use but with-
out access to the key to decrypt the traﬃc the
content being transferred is extremely diﬃcult
to determine. One option available to network
admins is to block the use of the sharefest.me
service by blacklisting the URL. This would
have the eﬀect of preventing casual usage of
the service but the source for Sharefest is pub-
licly available on Github https://github.com/
Peer5/Sharefest along with instruction and
support for installation of a personal server.
Peer5 also provide the API key for free to any-
one interested in the code. This means that any
IP or URL could become a Sharefest server.
One method of detecting the use of this ap-
plication is the STUN traﬃc generated once
a peer is identiﬁed and connection is initi-
ated. In testing an average of 5 STUN negoti-
ation/conﬁrmation exchanges were recorded ev-
ery second depending on the level of ﬁle trans-
fer data passing between the peers. This level
of noise would make the user of Sharefest rel-
atively easy to discover and no eﬀort is made to
obfuscate the communicating peers.
In an attempt to determine if this lack
of anonymization could be overcome, we at-
tempted to run Sharefest through a Tor cir-
cuit but both transfer utilities (JustBeamIt and
Sharefest) failed to complete the initial negotia-
tion with the relevant server. This was tested
using Tor Browser installed on a Windows 7
VMWare image. A possible alternative may be
to attempt the use of a SOCKS aware proxy to
direct the traﬃc to and from the application.
Alternatively a server running Sharefest could
be adapted to run as a Tor Service but this
would not alleviate the lack of privacy experi-
enced once data transfer was initiated between
peers.
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5.3 Transfer Big Files
Transfer Big ﬁles (TBF) https://
www.transferbigfiles.com/ oﬀers drag
and drop transfer of ﬁles with size limits
dependant on the user's account type. At the
most basic free account level, the limit is 100mb
per ﬁle totalling up to 20gb of ﬁles awaiting
transfer at any one time. Files are held by the
server for a default of 5 days before they are
removed. While this service does oﬀer HTML5
drag and drop upload capability, it is not a true
P2P application in that it does not transfer
directly from one local peer to one or more
remote peers. Some features of TBF include:
 senders must have an account to avail of
the service. This account requires a name,
email address and a password though of
note, there is no veriﬁcation of any of these
ﬁelds
 Recipients can either have their own ac-
count or can be sent a shortened URL alias
link with the domain tbf.me and a short
code for the ﬁle itself
 The initial DNS lookup for Transfer-
bigﬁles.com resolves to an IP address
69.174.247.183 - a server hosted in the US
 This account server negotiates TLS 1.0 as
part of the initial handshake
 File upload prompts DNS lookup of
0storageuk4.transferbigﬁles.com and
1storageuk4.transferbigﬁles.com which
both resolve to 83.222.233.155 (a server
group hosted in the UK)
 once uploaded the ﬁles remain on the stor-
age servers until picked up by the receipient
who must be notiﬁed separately
 File download is performed from one of the
tbfuk4.transferbigﬁles.com group servers
over standard HTTPS.
 TBF also oﬀers an application and a com-
mand line client with enhanced capabilities
over the browser based interface but this is
beyond the scope of this paper
It is worth noting that while this transfer ser-
vice is just standard HTTPS and so will be dis-
covered by standard forensic practices, if the
username and password can be recovered, the
site's account activity summary contains a full
activity log of all ﬁles uploaded including when
the transfer was started and when the recipi-
ent collected the ﬁle as well as the recipient's
account name.
5.4 JustBeamIt
An example of a basic HTML5 transfer applica-
tion is the ﬁle transfer service oﬀered at http://
www.justbeamit.com. The sending user con-
nects to the server over port 8080 (alternate
HTTP port) and performs a standard TCP
handshake followed by a series of HTTP GET re-
quests for client side JavaScripts.
 JustBeamIt.js - the base script that sets up
the variables and deﬁnes the communica-
tion functions
 BrowserDetectUtility.js - determines if the
user browser can properly support HTML5
data transfers
 FileHandler.js - manages the transfer to
and from the ﬁle array. Handles the array
reset and webpage notiﬁcations if the array
is emptied.
 UploadManager.js - deﬁnes the drag and
drop actions and deﬁnes the landing zone
 UploadHandler.js - Determines if the Client
needs to use XMLHttpRequest (XHR) or
FORM based uploading and generates the
QRCode.
 UploadHandler.XHR.js and UploadHan-
dler.FORM.js - the actual uploading scripts
There is an option to drag and drop a ﬁle into
the browser but in this instance the ﬁle browser
is used to select a ﬁle from the local user pictures
folder. Once selected the button Create Link
is clicked and the link http://www.justbeamit
.com/di33x is created along with a QRCode for
mobile use. This link can copied and sent to
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the receiving system, in the meantime the lo-
cal client is redirected to a relay server URL
for the upload itself (http://b1.justbeamit
.com/. On the remote system, the URL is
pasted into a browser and the system and the re-
mote client loads http://www.justbeamit.com
and immediately requests the download token
for the ﬁle ID di33x and downloads and runs the
set of JavaScripts. The server passes along the
token along with the current download status
(upload waiting) and the ﬁle descriptor (name,
size, extension). Once the remote user clicks on
the link to download the browser is redirected
to http://b1.justbeamit.com where the ﬁle
transfer is performed. Once complete the lo-
cal user is notiﬁed that the transfer has been
successful. The token used to download is now
invalidated and a new link must be generated if
the ﬁle is to be shared again. Similarly, there is
a 1000 second timeout period during which the
shared ﬁle must be downloaded before the op-
portunity expires and a new share token must
be generated.
While this method of ﬁle transfer provides
ease of use to the end user, all transfers are per-
formed via unencrypted traﬃc. The data being
transferred is susceptible to any form of eaves-
dropping capable of detecting traﬃc on any net-
work segment the traﬃc passes through. The
open nature of the transfer and the client side
execution of scripts (as well as the open ex-
change of tokens) allow for trivial man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks where an adversary ca-
pable of eavesdropping can use a proxy or other
interception utility to alter the packets in tran-
sit. One possible scenario would be the sub-
stitution of a harmless UploadManager.js script
for something less benign as identiﬁed by Jang-
Jaccard Jang-Jaccard and Nepal [2014] as a ris-
ing risk or, even exchanging the generated down-
load token for one that leads to a virus or other
form of malware.
From a security standpoint, defense against
the use of this service is quite straightforward.
Because of the application's use of a centralized
set of servers, a standard ﬁrewall rule to block
access to http://*.justbeamit.com would pre-
vent any upload but also any attempt to down-
load.
5.5 Any Send
Any Send http://www.anysend.com/ is a web
based ﬁle transfer utility that oﬀers a pure
web based alternative to its own download-
able application. The web page anysend.com
resolves to a set of four IP addresses divided
between Utah and Texas and all registered
to clickmein.com. The webpage consists of a
large background image and a single dropzone
for ﬁles to be sent. On dropping a ﬁle, the
background javascript helpers manage the ﬁle
upload to their servers. Once uploaded the
user is presented with a URL to send to the
recipient. The URL is comprised of the any-
send.com domain and a ﬁle identiﬁer generated
by the server (a 32 character string). Once the
recipient enters the URL into a browser they
are taken to an anysend.com page with details
of the ﬁle corresponding to the ﬁleID part of
the URL used. From here it is a standard
HTTPS download from the anysend servers
and the download URL will reﬂect the anysend
server url as well as the full ﬁlename of the ﬁle
with the term %20via%20AnySend.exe ap-
pended. eg: http://www.anysend.com/dl.php
?data=7f234e0920d8424833f97d3ab9380883\
...\&fn=orientdb-community-2.0.4\
%20via\%20AnySend.exe\&packageID=
ED59EE58A0380BBDB197A88F8290BDDE
6. FORENSIC
CONSEQUENCES OF
UNTRACEABLE FILE
TRANSFER
The facilitation of untraceable or anonymous
ﬁle exchange can lead to a number of potential
malicious use cases. For each of the scenarios
outlined below, an added dimension can be cre-
ated by the originator of the content: time. Due
to the ability to create one-time or temporary
access to any piece of content, the timeframe
where evidence may be recovered from remote
sharing peers might be very short.
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6.1 Cybercriminal Community
Backup
Unmonitored covert transfer could be used to
create a share and share alike model for the re-
mote encrypted backup of illegal content. The
sharing of these backups onto multiple remote
machines eﬀectively could provide the user with
a cloudless backup solution requiring minimal
trust with any remote users. The encryption of
the data before distribution to the community
can ensure that only the owner will ever have ac-
cess to decrypt the data. Trust only comes into
play should the remote nodes delete the infor-
mation or it otherwise becoming unrecoverable.
Having a secure, encrypted connection to a re-
mote backup might be desirable to cybercrim-
inals enabling the use of a kill-switch to their
local storage devices should the need arise.
6.2 Secure Covert Messaging
For example, the proof of concept based on
the BitTorrent Sync Protocol found at http://
missiv.es/. The application currently oper-
ates by saving messages to an outbox folder
in a synchronized share between peers that has
a read only key shared to the person you want
to receive the message. They in turn send you a
read only key to their outbox. One to many can
be achieved by sharing the read only key with
more than one person but no testing has been
done with synchronization timing issues yet and
key management may become an issue as a new
outbox would be needed for each private conver-
sation required.
6.3 Industrial Espionage
Many companies are aware of the dangers of
allowing unmonitored traﬃc on their networks.
However, quite often corporate IT departments
enforce a blocking of P2P technologies through
protocol blocking rules on their perimeter ﬁre-
walls. This has the eﬀect of cutting oﬀ any
ﬁle-sharing clients installed on the LAN from
the outside world. In addition to Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) to investigate the data por-
tion of a network packet passing the inspection
point, basic blocking of known IP address black-
lists in ﬁrewall rulesets can be used. The diﬃ-
culty in blocking HTTP based ﬁle transfers is
that the technology is likely used during reg-
ular employee Internet usage. HTTP trans-
fers can be used when emailing ﬁle attachments
or adding items to content management sys-
tem. One additional scenario where these ser-
vices could be used would be to transfer ﬁles
within a LAN and subsequent external exﬁltra-
tion from a weaker/less monitored part of the
network, e.g., guest wireless access.
6.4 Piracy
Like any other P2P technology, the ability to
transfer ﬁles in a direct manner from peer to
peer lends itself well to the unauthorized distri-
bution of copyrighted material. The sharing of
copyrighted multimedia, software, etc., between
peers using these covert services is less likely to
lead to prosecution compared with public piracy
on open ﬁle-sharing networks such as BitTor-
rent.
6.5 Alternative to Server Based
Website Hosting
This scenario involves the creation of static web-
sites served through a shared archive. These
websites could be directly viewed on each user's
local machine facilitating the easy distribution
of any illegal material. The local copies of the
website could receive updates from the webmas-
ter through the extraction of archived updated
distributed in a similar manner as the original.
7. POTENTIAL FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION
TECHNIQUES
Assuming access (physical or remote) can be ac-
quired to either end of the ﬁle transfer, then a
live acquisition of the evidence should be attain-
able. Performing evidence acquisition after the
fact would rely on traditional hard drive and
memory forensic techniques to see if any rem-
nants of the network communication remain.
The investigation of the unauthorized trans-
fer for information through one of these ser-
vices without access to either end of the trans-
fer can prove extremely diﬃcult. Assuming
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through some external means, the precise date
and time of the transfer were discovered. The
only method available to law enforcement is to
eﬀectively wiretap the transfer by running a
software or hardware based deep packet inspec-
tion tool on the network at either end of the
transfer.
To date there has been keen interest in re-
search performed on the forensic examination
of ﬁle sharing utilities and the type of security
risks they pose. Chung et al. [2012b] outlined a
best practice approach to the investigation of ﬁle
sharing using cloud based Storage-as-a-Service
(StaaS) utilities such as Dropbox, iCloud and
OneDrive. In 2014, Federici [2014] presented
Cloud Data Imager (CDI) a utility developed
to automate the retrieval of cloud based storage
artifacts from a suspect system and use these
credentials to access their secure storage online.
Scanlon et al. [2014] described a methodol-
ogy that leveraged the processes used by persis-
tent ﬁle synchronization services to ensure data
integrity to retrieve data that would otherwise
have been inaccessible. This could be as a result
of deliberate obfuscation such as encryption or
anti-forensic activities or it could be caused by
an error in the imaging process. The methodol-
ogy presented utilized the need for synchroniza-
tion group ongoing communication to enumer-
ate remote peers and to identify any authorized
peers that could provide a forensically true copy
of the suspect data.
Emerging ﬁle transfer utilities, such as the
purely browser based ﬁle transfer utilities based
on WebRTC, do not advertise persistence of
availability nor integrity checking beyond the
initial transfer and in many cases are only as-
sociated for the length of time that both par-
ties are online and in communication, directly or
otherwise. After this time, such as with Onion-
share for example, the address of the ﬁle source
will change completely and no longer be avail-
able to any peer authorized or otherwise.
This ephemeral nature of data transfer can
make any attempt to verify or re-create the cir-
cumstances of the ﬁle transfer diﬃcult if not
impossible and it very much depends on the
features of the individual application being em-
ployed.
8. CONCLUSION
The evolution of online ﬁle transfer systems
is becoming more and more covert through
employing encryption-based, server less, P2P
protocols. The development of HTML5 and
JavaScript based services proves particularly in-
teresting from a digital forensic perspective. As
these technologies mature, a future can be eas-
ily envisioned whereby the investigation and ev-
idence retrieval from these systems will prove
extremely diﬃcult, if not entirely impossible.
Daisy-chaining a number of the technologies
outlined in this paper has the potential to enable
malicious users to securely transfer any desired
information to another user/machine without
arousing suspicions of system administrators.
Identifying the use of a HTTPS, browser-based
P2P ﬁle transfer with relatively small transfer
sizes might prove prohibitively diﬃcult. The
investigation of these transfers may prove cost
prohibitive in terms of both time and money for
law enforcement to comprehensively investigate
and mitigation of the risk by way of security
policies or hardware and software based rulesets
may come at a price in terms system usability
that will be deemed too high.
8.1 Future Work
As privacy becomes easier for the end user to
accomplish, the role of forensics will become all
that much harder as not even the low hang-
ing fruit of browser history can be expected as
a starting point. Additionally, system security
will no longer be able to react as this may al-
ready be too late. As a future developement
in forensics there is clear potential for utilities
and techniques to be developed to help bridge
the gap between proactive security abnd reac-
tive forensics. Some areas of interest are
 Automated Detection of HTML5 and
WebRTC based Data Exﬁltration.
 Approximate Hashing Signatures  Ap-
proximate hashing facilitates the analysis
of network traﬃc as it could be applied to
© 2015 ADFSL Page 147
2015 CDFSL Proceedings HTML 5 Zero Conﬁguration Covert Channels: Security ...
recognise variations on patterns speciﬁc to
protocols and their timings used in HTML5
and WebRTC
 Forensic analysis of P2P over anonymizing
networks. Perhaps a lack of a footprint can
be proven to be a footprint in and of itself
in a networking environment.
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